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Abstract.
Future personal robots might possess the capability to au-
tonomously generate novel goals that exceed their initial program-
ming as well as their past experience. We discuss the ethical chal-
lenges involved in such a scenario, ranging from the construction of
ethics into such machines to the standard of ethics we could actually
demand from such machines. We argue that we might have to accept
those machines committing human-like ethical failures if they should
ever reach human-level autonomy and intentionality. We base our
discussion on recent ideas that novel goals could be originated from
agents’ value system that express a subjective goodness of world or
internal states. Novel goals could then be generated by extrapolating
what future states would be good to achieve. Ethics could be build
into such systems not just by simple utilitarian measures but also
by constructing a value for the expected social acceptance of a the
agent’s conduct.
1 Autonomous Robots
Goal-driven behavior has a long and venerable history in Artificial
Intelligence and robotics. Goals are frequently used to model high
level decision making and to guide low level motor control. In the
field of robotics, goals have played an important part in creating
robots capable of complex interactions with the environment and
with humans. In the vast majority of cases, the goals which direct the
behavior of robots are predefined or tightly parameterized by their
designers. The practice of predefining the goals that drive robot be-
havior gives designers the ability to ensure that this behavior remains
within agreed ethical norms. As robots become more autonomous
and as they operate in increasingly complex environments, however,
it becomes impractical to attempt to predefine the complete set of
robot goals that will cover every possible circumstance the robot
finds itself in. If intelligent and adaptive behavior is required of an au-
tonomous robot in unpredictable new circumstances, then the robot
will need to be equipped with the ability to create its own novel goals.
This then begs the question, if a robot can create its own novel goals,
how can designers ensure that these goals lead to ethical behavior
from the robot? In this paper we propose an approach to novel goal
creation which is based on social value systems and which, we be-
lieve, offers the best hope of generating goals that will lead to morally
acceptable behavior from a robot.
To illustrate the ethical issues that arise with novel goal creation,
we will briefly consider four typical robot applications: household
service robots, personal assistant robots, robot pets, and teaching
robots. The physical and software design of robots for each of these
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cases will be directed towards the creation of application specific be-
havior that the designers anticipate will be expected of their robots.
So household service robots might be expected to clean, personal as-
sistant robots could be required to liaise with clients, robot pets might
be required to entertain children, and teaching robots could reason-
ably be expected to engage children in an educational task.
In each of these application areas there are two general circum-
stances under which robots could create their own novel goals. The
first is when the owner of the robot issues an instruction to the robot
which requires new behavior. The household robot, which is de-
signed for a home environment, might, for example, be requested
to go and get some cash out of the ATM at the local bank. To comply
with this request the robot will need to create new goals for getting it-
self to the bank, including safely crossing roads, perhaps negotiating
a path through crowds of people, etc. It will also need to create new
goals for getting cash out of the ATM, which might include queuing
up for the machine, interacting with the machine, retrieving the cash,
and getting itself and the cash safely back to the home. There are
complex ethical considerations (e.g. safety, social norms) involved
the creation of each of these goals.
Similar examples can be found for the other three robotic applica-
tions; the teaching robot might be required to adapt to a new peda-
gogic approach or a different curriculum, the robot pet might need
to react to another new pet (real or artificial), the personal assis-
tant might be invited to join the company’s social event (e.g. soc-
cer match). These instructions or new requirements each involve the
creation of novel goals in contexts where there are complex ethical
considerations to take into account.
A significant challenge for the designers of robots that are capa-
ble of generating novel goals in response to instruction or external
circumstantial requirements is in evaluating the ethical implications
of those instructions or requirements. Contrast, for example, the in-
struction to “get cash from the bank” with “steal cash from the bank”.
Even when the motivation for the creation of new goals comes from
an external source (e.g. the robot’s owner), an ethical basis for their
creation is still required.
The second general circumstance under which robots could cre-
ate novel goals is when they are given the capacity to take the ini-
tiative in a given situation. This could happen, for example, if au-
tonomous robots are endowed with the ability to recognize and inter-
pret their own needs and the needs of others around them, and make
autonomous decisions on how to meet those needs. The household
robot might, for example, recognize that a visitor is hungry and so
might decide to bake a cake for them. The robot pet might see that
their human companion is lonely and so might decide to invite the
companion’s friend over. The teaching robot might see that a child
is in danger of harm and so forms the novel goal to prevent that
harm from occurring. These are all conveniently contrived ethical re-
sponses to perceived needs. But it would be just as easy for the robot
to take the initiative to do something which, unknown to them, would
be quite unethical in response to a perceived need. The well mean-
ing household robot might, for example, decide to cook beef burgers
for their hungry visitor, who turns out to be vegetarian. The robot
pet might phone an escort service for their lonely companion. The
robot teacher, whilst attempting to avoid harm to one child, might
unwittingly put another child in danger.
In all of these circumstances it will be expected that autonomous
robots that have the capacity to behave in novel ways, will also have
the capacity to recognize and take into account the ethical implica-
tions of those novel behaviors. This requires a novel goal generation
mechanism that can evaluate the ethical consequences of acting on
those goals.
Figure 1. Physical goals are actual objects towards which behavior is
directed. Intentional goals and teleological goals are representations of such
end-states in the mind of an acting and observing agent respectively.
2 Origination of Novel Goals
Today’s artificial agent are still extremely limited in their generation
of truly novel behavior and novel goals. What even counts a novel
goal is a delicate question [13]. Goals generally refer to the desired
end states of action. This can be seen from three different perspec-
tives (see Fig. 1): we may refer to the physical perspective of ac-
tual world states or objects they are referring to (such as a cake), an
outside observer’s teleological perspective (such as the observer ex-
plaining a robot’s behavior by thinking the robot is about to make
a cake), or the agent’s internal, intentional perspective (such as the
agent having a representation of making a cake as its goal).
What makes a goal actually novel depends on this perspective
[14]. Novel physical goals simply refer to novel physical states or
objects, but which do not necessarily concur with any intention of the
agent. The teleological perspective is more relevant to our discussion.
Novel teleological goals refer to an agent’s behavior that requires a
new explanation, very similar to emergent behavior [11, 5]. Looking
through the eyes of a system’s engineer, this would be any unforeseen
or not explicitly designed behavior. This exactly describes the exam-
ple scenarios we initially introduced, in which robots would generate
behavior that is outside their initial design parameters. While the tele-
ological perspective describes behavior from the outside, the inten-
tional perspective must be considered for the agent’s internal func-
tioning, motivation, and eventually for its ethical sensitivity. Novel
intentional goals are novel representation that the agent generates to
steer its behavior. They describe the agent’s decision making. A in-
tentional goal could be novel because it generates an entirely new
representation of something just for this purpose, or because some-
thing that as been represented already, but not immediately used for
behavior control, newly becomes a goal.
Novel intentional goals are routinely created already in existing AI
planning systems that are given specific goal representations from
the start, and which are autonomously decomposed into sub-goals
[3, 10]. Yet, such sub-goals necessarily necessarily stay within ex-
isting design parameters due to the explicitly designed initial goal.
The autonomous creation of entirely novel intentional goals has
been linked to notions of reward [1, 9] and reinforcement learning
[12, 7]. Agents could generate novel intentional goals by predict-
ing which states have the highest value (the prediction or future re-
ward). This is not necessarily limited to reward or cost functions in
any strictly economic or utilitarian way, but may may concern “sub-
jective” value function that account for a variety of needs and desires.
Such value functions provide the basis for (subjectively) rational be-
havior [17, 6], and therefore the selection of goals among known
behaviors, but also allows to make predictions and extrapolations to
entirely novel states that the agent has never experienced and that
seem valuable.
If an agent makes such an extrapolation to a presumably value
state, it takes the initiative to some new goal without explicit in-
struction. However, a novel goal (with respect to the agent’s initial
design) might also come in via an instruction such as a verbal com-
mand. In both cases, ethical considerations must take place. A robot
should neither generate an unethical goal autonomously, nor adopt an
instruction without ethical evaluation. In order to discuss this com-
plex of novel goals and ethics in this article, we consider the ethi-
cal dimension to be embedded in the shaping of the value functions.
Hence, we consider value functions that contain components of ethi-
cal goodness and badness of agents’ conduct.
3 The need for speculation
Future robotic or AI systems that could actually generate entirely
novel goals or adopt entirely goals by instruction pose a substantial
challenge to machine ethics. In this article we are therefore not ar-
guing that such machines should be built, but rather discuss possible
ethical mechanisms and consequences if they would be built.
The challenge is that, by definition, novel goals take an agent into
unknown territory. It has been emphasized that autonomous ethical
agents first of all need to be able to predict the consequences of their
behavior [16] for instance by means of internal models [18]. When an
agents actually enter new territory such predictions can be grounded
on general knowledge but cannot be perfectly accurate. Rather, the
agent has to make informed guesses what might follow from its con-
duct. In human terms, it has to speculate. However, predicting the
bare consequences of action is not the only problem. Also the ethical
value of entirely novel behavior might not be known or at least not
perfectly known to the system. When an agent enters domains that
have neither be thought about at design time nor have been previously
experienced by the agent, it might simply misjudge what constitutes
as good or bad behavior. Again, the agent would have to make an
informed guess.
No example we could give could actually prove the existence of
cases in which ethical rules necessary for some behavior could not
have been pre-programmed at design time — the fact that we bring
up the example shows that at least we might have considered the case
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Figure 2. An agent assigns a reward/value semantic to the state space. The reward function may contain typical egocentric measures, but also social
components such as the need for social acceptance (by its owner or also other people) in order to shape ethical behavior or an immediate reward for obedience
to instruction. It could then generate novel goals autonomously by predicting valuable states, or take goal candidate by instruction that are then evaluated for
their value. For instance, world states in which cakes exist might become a goal due to direct instruction, but also due to an empathic response to the owner’s
liking of cakes.
during design. Yet, one might doubt that programming an entirely
comprehensive and universal ethics engine is possible. In any way,
we think that the examples we discuss here show cases in which it is
very plausible that a system built for some purpose does not possess
ethical competences with respect to novel domains.
In the example of a household robot being ordered to get cash from
an ATM we can clearly see how such a system might lack proper pre-
diction skills about the consequences of its action. The robot might
not even have been designed to go outside and navigate there. In such
a new environment it might lack skills to predict pedestrian move-
ment or eventually the behavior of the ATM interface itself. This
scenario might also come with a lack of ethical sensitivity: general
ethics rules of moving through traffic and public spaces might not
have been given to such a system. Even if they were given – common
sense might suggest so – a purely domestic robot might not have a
concept of possession and the ethical rules around it. If it is not able
to withdraw cash from the ATM it might not consider it mischievous
to steal it (let alone to rob it), since within its single household envi-
ronment it might just take any object its owner desires.
Also the the scenario of a personal assistant robot that is asked
to participate in a soccer game comprises both difficulties: both the
particular world dynamics or soccer as well as ethics and morals of
team sports might not be known to such a system. In particular the
moral dynamics of such matches are highly non-trivial: the agent
would be required to cooperate with individuals on its team, but work
against the other team while still complying to sports specific rules.
Similarly, robots that take the initiative face uncertainties and
may mis-predict both the immediate consequences as and the ethi-
cal aspects of their proactive behavior. A household robot that au-
tonomously decides to make a cake because cakes make his owner
happy might use ingredients the owner wanted to use differently, or
even use ingredients a visitor is allergic to. Conversely, the robot
might observe how displeased his owner is about the neighbors’ bark-
ing dog, and pro-actively decide to make his owner happy by shutting
the dog up – maybe injuring or killing the dog due to misjudgment
of immediate consequences of its action or the ethical implications.
4 Social Value Systems for Ethics
Simple rule-based approaches to ensuring that the novel goals gener-
ated by autonomous robots result in ethically acceptable behavior are
impractical for three reasons. The first is that hand-crafting a set of
ethical rules that could anticipate every circumstance in which novel
goals might be created by a robot is equivalent to the problem of try-
ing to predefine a complete set of robot goals at design stage, which
is against the basic premise of this paper as we have already argued.
The second reason for asserting that the rule-based ethics approach
is impractical for novel goal creation is that “simple” ethical rule
sets do not work well in situations where all possible actions have
negative ethical consequences. The so-called ‘Trolley problem’ [15],
which describes a scenario in which any behavioral option involves
the death of humans, illustrates this issue very well. Also the exam-
ples for novel goals in this paper are full of subtleties (possession,
fair-play in sports, animal rights) that can barely be stated in any
compact form. The third reason that simple rule-based approaches
are impractical is that as the ethical rule set increases to cover the
widening set of circumstances, it becomes ever more challenging to
avoid internal conflict and ensure consistency between the rules.
There are broader issues with attempting to ‘design in’ or hard
code an ethical system for a robot when that robot may be expected
to handle novel domains autonomously. One issue is that predefined
ethical systems may reflect more of the ethical preferences of the
designers rather than those of people who end up being subject to
the robot’s actions. This is especially true in cases where novel robot
actions take it into new circumstances and amongst different groups
of people who have distinct cultural expectations that were not an-
ticipated by the designers. Robotics and AI literature nowadays rou-
tinely talks about agents’ adaptation and learning for the prediction
of unknown environments and mastering of novel skills. Then, we
think it is natural that an agent must also be able to acquire novel
ethical concepts and values along with those environments and skills.
All of this leads to the question - how can a robot autonomously
acquire a sense of ethics for novel domains? If robots are to be ‘ethi-
cal’ in the eyes of those who interact with them, then they will need
to be able to adapt to unwritten, socially evolved ethical preferences
of the communities in which they find themselves. Human moral de-
velopment provides a precedent for such adaptation [2]. We propose
that novel goals along with ethics be generated on the basis of an
adaptive social value system (see Fig. 2). This system is founded
on both predefined egocentric motivators (e.g. self sustenance, pain,
intrinsic motivation) and adaptable social motivators (e.g. empathy,
the need for social acceptance) that are activated by changes in state
space. The social motivators are shaped (‘learnt’) through interac-
tion with the robot’s social partner(s). This goes beyond simple re-
inforcers such as reward objects or pain, but makes social relation a
direct object of internal reward signals. Hence, like humans, robots
could be repelled from conducting behavior that would repel impor-
tant social partners from them – and increase behavior which results
in positive reactions from the social environment. The value of the
activated egocentric and social motivators is estimated through an
expectation of future reward signals. In the case where the robot is
taking the initiative, the motivators with the highest estimated future
value would be selected to form the novel goal. A household robot
that has run out of instructed tasks thus might predict a happy and
grateful owner, thus a positive social interaction, if only there was a
cake.
In the case of an instruction ffrom the social partner, the value
of the proposed candidate goal would be generated from the same
mechanism of evaluating expectation of future reward of that goal on
the basis of currently activated egocentric and social motivators. In
this case, one of the social motivators might be obedience. We think
this approach could provide a very powerful mechanism to (i) cap-
ture the subtleties of what humans perceive to be ethical conduct and
(ii) allow for the acquisition of novel ethical aspects along with new
environments and tasks. This would reflect a level of autonomy, ca-
pability, and adaptivity that is indeed comparable to human achieve-
ment. However, such an adaptive social approach would be subject to
the same ethical flaws as have been shown to exist in humans. Clas-
sic experiments like the Milgram Experiment [8] and the Stanford
Prison experiment [4] have well shown how humans can adopt or
autonomously generate unethical conduct in certain social contexts.
If we ever want to – or will – bring robots to human-comparable
autonomy, capability, and adaptivity, we may have to face them hav-
ing human-comparable flaws. As long as universal and verifiably
comprehensive rules of ethics are not in sight, we may not rule out
this possibility.
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